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FOREWORD

This study, written by Colonel Patrick M. O’Donogue,
USMC, as a strategy research project, considers a topic of
key importance to U.S. national security Japan’s
agreement to cooperate with the United States on the
development of a theater missile defense (TMD). China
vigorously opposes this plan and insists that U.S.
development of TMD and national missile defense systems
will destabilize its strategic relationship with the United
States. China’s concerns center primarily on Japan’s and
Korea’s development of deployable upper-tier missile
defense capabilities and technology, along with equipment
transfers of any kind to Taiwan.
Colonel O’Donogue, a member of the Army War College
Class of 2000, does a remarkable job of addressing this
matter in a thoughtful, articulate, and comprehensive
manner. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to
publish his study as part of our Letort Paper series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN JAPAN:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE U.S-CHINA-JAPAN
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Introduction.
The role of theater missile defense (TMD) in the
U.S.-China-Japan strategic relationship has taken on
increased importance as its development and deployment
by the United States and, most likely, Japan becomes
inevitable. The August 1999 agreement between the United
States and Japan to cooperate on research and development
of a sea-based TMD system raised the stakes in what has
been, so far, a “war of words” on the need for TMD in Japan,
between the United States and Japan, on one side, and
China, on the other. American and Chinese perceptions of
the efficacy and utility of theater missile defense in national
security planning differ radically. U.S. officials and scholars
argue that missile defense promotes national and
international security. The Chinese, however, reject the
assumptions and logic of U.S. support for national missile
defense (NMD) and TMD.
U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy relies on both the U.S.
strategic nuclear triad and U.S. ballistic missile defenses,
with the latter reinforcing the stabilizing effects of
deterrence. Unlike the United States, China relies
exclusively on land-based missiles as deterrents. So China
perceives a strengthened U.S. defense against her
land-based missiles as destabilizing, because such defenses
deprive China of her power to deter. However, U.S. officials
perceive a growing missile threat from “rogue nations,”
while the threats of accidental and unauthorized launches
remain. The United States also has an inherent obligation
to protect forward-based and forward-deployed forces
against the threat of ballistic missile attacks. The 1998
1

North Korean Taepo Dong-1 launch gave credibility to such
threats.1
Chinese officials argue, however, that these threats are
not serious enough to justify NMD and TMD development. 2
They insist NMD and TMD pose serious negative
implications for global arms control and nonproliferation
efforts, specifically the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) II, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). U.S. officials counter that
arms control and nonproliferation are in the interests of the
community of nations, and are not threatened by NMD and
TMD.3
Growing technological cooperation between the two
nations means inevitable Japanese help with development
and eventual deployment of TMD. At a minimum, lower-tier
TMD deployments in Japan will be continually upgraded to
protect U.S. troops and military assets. The Chinese have
expressed a willingness to accept lower-tier TMD
deployment that protects U.S. bases. But China opposes the
development and deployment of upper-tier TMD systems,
especially sea-based versions, which could be employed to
protect Taiwan. 4 Shu Zukang, Director General of the
Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Department of Arms Control,
best expresses the Chinese position:
We do not envisage a dispute concerning development of what
we would call genuine TMD. Here I am referring to those
anti-theater missile systems used solely in a limited area. What
China is opposed to is the development, deployment and
proliferation of antimissile systems with potential strategic
defense capabilities in the name of TMD that violate the letter
and spirit of ABM and go beyond the legitimate self-defense of
relevant countries.5

This statement lends de facto legitimacy to the sale of
Patriot PAC-3 missiles, a lower-tier capability, to Taiwan.
The Chinese insist, however, that Taiwan’s status as part of
China obviates its entitlement to the independent receipt of
2

arms. But China seems confident that it maintains
sufficient force, both in aircraft and ballistic missiles, to
overwhelm any Taiwanese defense, which renders such
sales more an issue of principle than practicality.
Japanese adoption of TMD introduces new dynamics
into the U.S.-Japan alliance. If brought to fruition in a
rational way, TMD will precipitate a broad range of
operational initiatives, will require changes to bilateral
doctrine and will redefine the role of the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). TMD poses the same
implications for bilateral integration at the operational and
support levels as the Defense Guidelines do, with even more
tangible consequences for the bilateral alliance. TMD will
undoubtedly influence the way the United States and Japan
plan, procure, consult, and operate in the future. 6
This study describes the historical precedence that led to
a decision to develop TMD and seriously consider its
deployment in Japan. It then explores the strategic setting
that shapes the positions of Japan, China and the United
States with regard to TMD. Next, it analyzes possible
effects of TMD on the U.S.-Japan alliance. It then reviews
Chinese objections to TMD and their implications for the
U.S.-China relationship. Following this, it explores the U.S.
options for TMD development and deployment. The study
concludes with a discussion of the desirability of the United
States maintaining a firm, open dialogue with China that
addresses cogent concerns that, if carefully handled, offer
reasons for optimism.
Background.
Theater missile defense encompasses a range of
lower-tier (endo-atmospheric–within the atmosphere) and
upper-tier (exo-atmospheric–outside the atmosphere)
systems intended to intercept and destroy short (<1000 km)
and medium range (1000-3500 km) ballistic missiles. (See
Table 1.) Relevant lower-tier U.S. systems under
development include the U.S. Navy Aegis Standard Missile
3

II, also known as Navy Area Wide, and the U.S. Army
Patriot missile, PAC-3 variant (Table 2). These systems
advertise effectiveness against missiles with up to a
1,500-km range.
They do not fall under the provisions of the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. 7 Upper-tier TMD
Type Missile

Range

Short Range Ballistic Missile
(SRBM)

<1,000 km

Medium Range Ballistic
Missile (MRBM)

1,000 km to 3,500 km

Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile (IRBM)

3,500 km to 5,500 km

Table 1. Types of Ballistic Missiles.

System

Type

Missile

Patriot PAC-3

Lower-tier

Patriot

Navy Area Wide

Lower-tier

Standard Missile
II Block IVA

Medium Extended
Air Defense
System (MEADS)

Lower-tier

MEADS

Theater High
Altitude Air
Defense (THAAD)

Upper-tier

THAAD

Table 2. U. S. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems.
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systems are in various stages of development. They include
the Navy Theater Wide system, again, an Aegis-based
system using the Standard Missile III and the U.S. Army
Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. (See
Table 2.) Both systems would incorporate hit-to-kill
technology in an exo-atmospheric vehicle to intercept longer
range, higher speed missiles. 9
U.S.-Japan dialogue on missile defense, especially
theater missile defense, is well-established. Limited
discussions began as early as 1983, at the inception of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”). 10Given the
impetus of the 1990-91 Gulf War and U.S. experience with
Iraqi SCUD ballistic missiles, in June 1992 the Bush
Administration proposed Japanese (and South Korean)
TMD deployments. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin visited
Tokyo in October 1993 and asked for formal Japanese
participation in TMD. But trade tensions between the two
countries limited the U.S. request for participation to only
three options: joint development; buying TMD “off-theshelf” (primarily from U.S. manufacturers); or engaging in
gradual technology exchanges. 11 This approach met with a
cool reception in Japan. In fact, the Japanese perceived it as
a blatant U.S. attempt to obtain their technology.
The TMD alliance revived in 1994 with the
establishment of the bilateral U.S.-Japan Theater Missile
Defense Working Group. The limited U.S. offers of 1993
faded from view while the partners concentrated on
examining Japanese missile defense requirements and the
potential for bilateral collaboration. 12 But several years of
discussion produced no impetus to move talks beyond the
exploratory phases. Then, in 1996, developments in North
Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs and the
steady growth of Chinese military capabilities, specifically a
significant ballistic missile force and its demonstrated use
in the Straits of Taiwan, proved to be a catalyst: the United
States and Japan began serious TMD negotiations. The
event that most riveted Japanese attention to the threat
from ballistic missiles, however, was the North Korean test
5

of a three stage Taepo Dong-1 missile (See Table 3) in
August 1998.
Missile System

Range/Payload

SCUD B

300 km/single conventional
or chemical warhead

SCUD C

550 km/single conventional
warhead

Nodong-1

1,300 km/single conventional
chemical or nuclear warhead

Nodong-2

1,500 km/single conventional
chemical or nuclear warhead

Taepo Dong-1

2,000 km/single conventional
or nuclear warhead

Table 3. North Korean Ballistic Missiles. 13
The Japanese concluded that the most logical program
for bilateral technology cooperation would be a Navy
Theater Wide (NTW) program. The JSDF’s Maritime
Self-Defense Force possessed the necessary platforms
(Aegis cruisers), and the program lacked sufficient maturity
that would guarantee meaningful participation by
Japanese industry. This pragmatic approach to
development maximized potential profits and assured
favorable bilateral technology cooperation for Japanese
industry. The U.S. impetus for pressing the Japanese on
TMD was the presence of over 100,000 U.S. military
personnel in Northeast Asia, with 55,000 of those stationed
in Japan (to include Okinawa). The test of the North Korean
Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile sharpened Japanese public
attention and underscored the apparent need for protection
from unpredictable nations. Thus in August 1999 the
Japanese joined the United States in a 5-year defense

6

program to cooperate on research and development of a
theater missile defense system. 14

Figure 1. Estimated Ranges of Current
15
and Potential North Korean Ballistic Missiles.
7

Likewise, the Japanese became more aware of the
Chinese ballistic missile program. The Chinese threat did
not seem as immediate as the one from North Korea;
however, Japanese officials realized that missiles directed
at Taiwan could be redirected toward them and that
road-mobile missiles now under development in China
could be targeted against Japan. Should the Japan-China
relationship change, the Japanese knew the risks.
The Strategic Setting.
East Asia in general, and Northeast Asia in particular,
appears to be in a dangerous strategic setting. The regional
characteristics include major shifts in the balance of power,
skewed distributions of economic and political power within
and between countries, political and cultural diversity, an
anemic security apparatus, and widespread territorial
disputes over natural resource issues. 16 Chances for
escalation of tension in the area seem great, especially
without a U.S. military presence in the region. The 20th
century history of East Asia proves that mistrust between
two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take
precautionary and defensively-motivated measures that
are perceived as offensive threats. 17These perceptions can
lead to countermeasures in kind, begetting an actionreaction cycle that increases regional tensions and creates a
self-fulfilling prophecy about the region’s volatility. 18In
view of all these variables that might fuel insecurities, East
Asia appears quite dangerous. Not only could dramatic and
unpredictable changes in the distribution of military
capabilities increase uncertainty and mistrust, but the
importance of sea-lanes and secure energy supplies to
almost all regional actors could encourage a destabilizing
competition to develop power-projection capabilities on the
seas and in the skies. Because of the perception as offensive
threats, power-projection forces heighten spiraling tensions
as opposed to weapons that can only defend a nation’s
homeland. Perhaps even more important in East Asia than
these variables are psychological factors (such as the
8

historical mistrust and animosity among regional actors)
and political geography issues relating to the Taiwan
question, which make defensive systems (such as TMD) in
the region appear threatening to other nations’ security. 19
Policy Concerns.
Japanese policy seeks to negotiate the delicate balance
among its own security; its political, diplomatic, and
economic alliance with the United States; and its political,
diplomatic, and economic relationship with China. Japan
still depends on American strategic security, although some
would argue this relationship approaches “normalcy.” 20So
Japan’s long-term policy goal may be self-sufficiency, even
in matters of security. But would a TMD alliance between
the United States and Japan hasten self-sufficiency or delay
it? Other questions quickly arise: Is TMD effective? How
much would it cost?
Chinese policy seeks to further the development of
China into the preeminent Western Pacific/Northeast
Asian regional power. 21Broadly stated, China believes
missile defense programs will undermine strategic stability
by weakening its one viable deterrent capability and
precipitate a new arms race. Specifically, the Chinese worry
that Japanese TMD programs will obviate their ballistic
missile force; undermine their regional security; lead to
Japan’s eventual remilitarization; aid in the defense of
Taiwan; and retard current global arms control efforts that
reduce or check stronger powers such as the United States.
The United States would ideally like to participate in a
bilateral theater missile defense that protects its forward
deployed and forward based forces in Northeast Asia, that
protects the Japanese main islands, and that does not
precipitate a regional arms race. To this end, key U.S.
concerns are proliferation of the ballistic missile threat,
compliance with agreed-to nonproliferation protocols, and
deployment of a viable TMD system without precipitating a

9

Figure 2. Estimated Ranges of Current Chinese
22
Ballistic Missiles.
10

cycle of improvements and counter-improvements in
American and Chinese arsenals.
Considerations.
The United States and Japan estimate TMD will cost
$15 billion for research, development and deployment based
on the U.S. Navy Theater Wide system. But investment of
this magnitude (approximately 15 percent of the total
Japanese defense spending from 2000-2006) may adversely
affect other necessary defense programs (such as FS-X, an
indigenous fighter program). Fiscal constraint becomes a
significant consideration in light of the stated Japanese
policy of no increased defense spending over the next 5
years.
The U.S. side expresses concerns that the Japanese
partnership may lead to redistribution of monies within the
internal U.S. defense budget among competing missile
defense programs. In other words, now that the Japanese
have committed to cooperative research and development of
an upper-tier naval system, the U.S. upper-tier land system
may not receive the planned and budgeted amounts needed
so that the partnership with Japan on the naval system can
be kept on schedule. 23
Japan is also very worried over Chinese reaction to its
pursuit of TMD. Chinese officials encourage some of Japan’s
fears by maintaining that TMD in Japan would trigger a
regional arms race. First, they argue TMD would require
China to build up its own missiles to overcome the missile
defense system; they warn that this “action-reaction” cycle
could spin out of control. 24Second, they claim Japan could
use TMD technologies to manufacture offensive missiles.
The Chinese would consider this very provocative, requiring
a military response, most likely in the form of increased
inventories of Chinese missiles.
For its part, the United States views the deployment of
the North Korean Nodong-1 and Nodong-2 SRBM’s and the
11

Missile System
(U.S. Name in
Brackets)

Estimated
Number in
Service

Range/Payload

DF-3 (CSS-2)

2,800 km/single
nuclear or
conventional
warhead

38

DF-4 (CSS-3)

4,750 km/single
nuclear warhead

12

DF-5/5A (CSS-4)

13,000+ km/single
nuclear warhead

10

DF-21/21A (CSS-5)

1,800 km/single
nuclear or
conventional
warhead

8

DF-15/M-9 (CSS-6)

600 km/single
nuclear or
conventional
warhead

4

DF-11/M-11 (CSS-7)

300 km/single
nuclear or
conventional
warhead

unknown

DF-31

8,000 km/single or
MIRV nuclear
warhead(s)

unknown

DF-41

12,000 km/single or
MIRV nuclear
warhead(s)

unknown

Table 4. Chinese Ballistic Missiles.
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development of the Taepo Dong-1 MRBM and Taepo Dong-2
ICBM (Table 3) as the most immediate and realistic threats
12

in the region. Chinese CSS-5 and CSS-6 could also target
Japan, but Taiwan dominates Chinese targeteering. Road
mobile missiles under development in China (DF-31 and
DF-41) (Table 4) are unlikely candidates for targeting
Japan and by extension, U.S. forces, but they do retain the
capability. 26
The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Theater Missile
Defense.
The current U.S.-Japan security relationship bases
itself on the bilateral review that took place from October
1994 to April 1996, the resulting East Asia Strategy Report
(Nye Initiative), and the follow-on U.S.-Japan Joint
Security Declaration. This declaration attempted to
demonstrate that the 2-year review of the security
relationship had produced an alliance with great political
and operational capability. 27 An initiative in the Joint
Security Declaration called for a review of existing
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, seeking to expand
them to include a focus on cooperation in responding to
regional contingencies, as well as the direct defense of
Japan. Concurrent negotiations quickly incorporated TMD
cooperation into the Guidelines review process, which
culminated in August 1999 when the United States and
Japan signed a TMD cooperation agreement. This
agreement calls for shared fiscal and technology
responsibility in the development of a sea-based TMD.
U.S. Positions. U.S. proponents of TMD argue that,
regardless of its impact on U.S.-China relations, or its effect
on global arms control, or its effects on atomic states’
nuclear strategy, TMD remains essential to defend
deployed U.S. forces overseas. Proponents further claim
that Japanese TMD offers the potential to enhance the
bilateral security arrangement and provide funding,
technology, and customers for an extremely costly and
complex system.
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Advocates maintain that TMD provides a bulwark for
U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against newly emerging
“rogue states,” against emerging and established limited
ballistic missile threats, and against chemical and
biological threats for which nuclear deterrence alone does
not offer sufficient deterrence. Second, TMD protects
coalitions from intimidation. Third, TMD strengthens the
reciprocal commitment for the United States to defend
Japan and for Japan to defend forward-based U.S. forces.
Fourth, assuming the U.S. deployment of TMD to protect its
globally-based forces, TMD cannot be deployed to protect
U.S. personnel without also affording protection to the
Japanese population. Fifth, without TMD, Japan may feel
more vulnerable to limited ballistic missile attack and may
become predisposed to develop its own nuclear deterrent. 28
Critics of Japanese TMD argue that the severity of the
threat does not justify the cost. Further, they assert that
TMD, as a tenant of counterproliferation, is faulty. TMD
will overwhelm Japan’s limited national security
capabilities and leave Japan unprepared to handle the
strategic responsibilities inherent to TMD. The cost of TMD
is prohibitive for Japan. And, finally, critics assert that only
arms reduction, not deterrence, guarantees security.
Japanese Positions. The advantages of TMD dominate
the Japanese debate. The apparent lack of dissent results
from the exceptional concern engendered by the North
Korean Taepo Dong-1 missile flight test in August 1998 and
the apparent benefit of TMD development to Japanese
industry. Such solidarity will be temporary, however, as the
high cost becomes clear.
Proponents of TMD stress that a viable missile threat
exists from North Korea and China that must be contained.
Second, they point out the potential for a significant amount
of bilateral technology exchange with the United States,
noting that industrial cooperation, to include licensed
indigenous production of TMD components, will be worth
billions of yen. 29
14

Opponents of TMD argue that the prohibitive cost will
not allow funding for other essential defense programs.
They point out that upper-tier TMD systems prohibited by
the 1972 ABM Treaty will limit the usefulness of TMD to
Japan. Most importantly, adoption of TMD systems will
precipitate confrontation with China. 30
Alliance Implications. The complexity of TMD is
staggering. Each partner must contemplate a broad range
of detailed issues, not the least of which include formulation
of an effective bilateral command and control strategy; the
potential for truly integrated combined missile defense
operations; and bilateral military connectivity that far
outpaces what is now practical or even imagined in the
alliance relationship. 31
TMD will be effectively employed only if there exists a
seamless and unimpeded command and control of disparate
sensors and weapons, commanded by both nations, and
controlled by a variety of interconnected military
organizations, doctrinally linked; only if Japan’s individual
Self-Defense Forces cooperate with each other and with
U.S. forces in unprecedented intimacy; and only if Japan’s
air defense system rebuilds from the ground up. 32If and
when all this happens, Japan will achieve a significant role
in regional and global arms control and nonproliferation
initiatives. Likewise, it will bolster the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. What may start as an alliance management
initiative may become an alliance-defining initiative, on the
leading edge of the revolution in military affairs as part of a
system that boasts unprecedented connectivity,
interoperability and seamless command and control. 33
Strategic Implications for the U.S.-China
Relationship.
TMD Transfers to Taiwan: “Umbrella over Taiwan.”The
issue that arouses the most Chinese passion is Taiwan.
Chinese nationalists vehemently claim Taiwan. They
deflect any outside influence with charges of “interference
15

in internal Chinese affairs” and “an affront to Chinese
sovereignty.” The rulers of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) will address the Taiwan issue in terms of an “internal
affair” and rebuff all attempts to legitimize other states’
contact with Taipei. This approach serves, in turn, to uphold
the legitimacy of the mainland regime and further isolate
Taiwan from vital sources of economic, political, and
military support.
China worries that if it wavers the slightest on Taiwan
and the territory achieves viable independence, then other
regions of China seeking autonomy, such as Tibet and
perhaps Xinjiang, would be encouraged in their struggles.
The specter of internal disruption always looms large in the
CCP’s leadership calculus.
The possibility of Japanese TMD equipment or
technology being sold or transferred to Taiwan elicits a
visceral, menacing reaction from the Chinese. China
maintains that TMD technology and equipment transferred
to Taiwan would exacerbate missile proliferation, violate
the spirit and intent of the MTCR, and encourage
Taiwanese ambitions for independence. Further, a
sea-based Japanese TMD might also be used to protect
Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation between
Taiwan and mainland China, despite China’s ability to
overwhelm Taiwan with sheer numbers of missiles. The
inclusion of Japan, and by extension the United States, in
any cross-strait conflict dramatically raises the strategic
stakes. This political issue, along with the potential for
quick escalation to crisis proportions, causes the greatest
concern for the Chinese, not actual TMD missile
performance.
The importance of Taiwan in Chinese calculations about
TMD cannot be overstated. The nature of the cross-strait
conflict defies the usual arguments about the offensedefense balance and the “security dilemma.” In sum, the
arguments that the buildup of defensive weapons and

16

adoption of defensive doctrine should not be destabilizing
fall on deaf Chinese ears.
According to conventional wisdom, defensive weapons
destabilize because they shore up the territorial status quo
by deterring or physically preventing aggressors from
achieving revisionist goals, whereas offensive weapons
destabilize because they threaten the status quo. 34China,
however, retains as its primary policy objective the
prevention of Taiwan declaring permanent independence
from the Chinese nation. A cross-strait relationship that
would legalize and freeze the territorial status quo re mains
the main threat to Chinese policy. China employs military
and economic coercion as her primary means of countering
that threat. Beijing considers traditionally defensive
weapons in the hands of Taiwan and any potential political
allies (the United States and Japan) as dangerous, because
they give Taiwan officials additional confidence in their
efforts to legitimize the territorial status quo. 35
TMD in Japan would reduce China’s ability to threaten
Taiwan with ballistic missiles, her primary means of
coercion. Significantly, the ship-based system under
development causes acute worry because of its large
“footprint” and easy deployability. Effectiveness of the
system aside, China agonizes about the psychological and
political effect the system would have on Taipei’s attitudes
about seeking diplomatic latitude, as well as U.S. and
Japanese attitudes about cross-strait relations. 36
TMD Cooperation Will Lead to Japan’s Eventual
Remilitarization. The Chinese perceive a shift in the
U.S.-Japan alliance dating back to the mid-1980s. They
maintain that de facto licensed coproduction programs such
as the F-15J and Patriot PAC 2+, coupled with changes in
alliance structure precipitated by the Nye Initiative and the
subsequently revised Defense Guidelines, show a
willingness, perhaps even an eagerness, by the United
States and Japan to “normalize” Japan’s security.

17

TMD heightens this concern when viewed in the
aggregate with other U.S.-Japan alliance developments.
These include the new Japanese LST (landing ship, tank), a
ship capable of launching and recovering aircraft; the
family of Japanese space launch vehicles (SLV) regarded as
potential dual-use platforms; and the Japanese purchase of
Patriot PAC-3 missiles with their limited lower-tier
capability. 37China views such developments as precursors
to the relaxing of Japanese law. 38
Indeed, U.S. pressures on Japan to accept a greater
share of the burden of its own national defense in effect
encourages Japan to become self-sufficient. Further, in the
56 years since the end of World War II, it has become
inevitable that the post-war U.S.-Japan security
relationship will change, especially in view of Japan’s
growth as a global economic power. Wealth begets the
imminent potential for military power.
TMD and the prospect of meshing national command
and control systems, both for regional defense and as an
“early warning” for proposed U.S. NMD, mean that Japan
will develop capabilities beyond what its present
constitution allows. 39Complementary to TMD is a spacebased sensor system to aid in early warning and detection of
incoming missiles. Japanese law prohibits the
militarization of outer space. Satellite sensors to warn of a
hostile missile launch and perhaps to help guide an
intercept constitute a necessary part of a TMD system.
China recognized these overt harbingers of change. It
also recognized the implications of the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs future diplomatic blueprint, Challenge
2001. 4 0 Accordingly, the Chinese assert that TMD
represents another, albeit significant, step by Japan to take
its national security into its own hands. The implications for
China of a militarized, self-sufficient Japan defy description. Japan’s technical ability, industrial potential, and
geographic position would inhibit the Chinese desire to
remain militarily preeminent in Northeast Asia. The most
18

discussed development of any “remilitarization” of Japan
and the TMD implications of that action concern an
independent Japanese ability to build and deliver offensive
ballistic missiles. China maintains that the technology
transfers of TMD components are directly applicable to
offensive systems. Hence, China views U.S. cooperation
with Japan on TMD as nothing less than U.S. support for
emergent Japanese military power. In response, the United
States reassures that all MTCR regimes would be followed.
The United States contends that, in fact, Japan’s
indigenous space program and its family of SLVs exhibit
more compatibility for this type of technology transfer than
TMD.41
TMD Will Lead to an Independent Japanese Nuclear
Deterrent. The Japanese debate on security normalization
and nuclear weapons development is in its infancy and the
implications of self-sufficiency remain unspoken. As the
only nation to endure nuclear attack, Japan can articulate
the most compelling reasons for not developing such a
capability.
But China maintains that Japan revealed its
pragmatism regarding the use of nuclear devices when it
proceeded with the commercial development of nuclear
power in the 1970s. Perceptual differences here again take
on exceptional significance. Old hostilities from the war
years of the 1930s and 1940s do not allow for a Chinese
acceptance of Japan’s benign use of nuclear power absent
U.S. restraints.
More pragmatically, however, Japanese nuclear power
exhibits remarkable transparency (transparency addresses
the ability to verify that materials are not used for nuclear
weapons making, etc.). So mutual confidence measures and
transparency exercises could keep the “nuclear genie in the
bottle” and limit regional fears. Further, TMD obviates the
need for an independent Japanese deterrent by shoring up
the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 42

19

TMD Undermines China’s Nuclear Deterrent. This is the
central issue to the U.S.–China missile defense debate. The
United States relies on both offensive forces (the strategic
nuclear triad of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles,
and bombers) and defensive forces (ballistic missile
defenses), with the latter providing reinforcement to the
stabilizing influence of deterrence. China derives its
deterrence solely from an offensive land based missile force.
These differences are stark. China’s reliance on only one
form of nuclear deterrence makes any attempt to restrain it
destabilizing. China consistently maintains TMD
undermines its offensive nuclear deterrence. China’s
declared no-first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons contradicts
this argument, however, unless its declared policy is false
and China, in fact, targets Japan (active targeting is
considered a violation of NFU protocols). So China’s
objections to TMD reveal a significant inconsistency in
Chinese doctrine. 43
TMD Will Provoke Changes in Chinese Nuclear Doctrine.
Chinese responses to Japanese TMD suggest support for the
evolution of Chinese nuclear doctrine from one of “minimum
deterrence” to one of “limited deterrence.” Minimum
deterrence, according to China, means possession of a small
number of nuclear warheads sufficient to inflict
unacceptable damage on a handful of enemy cities. 44In
truth, Chinese missiles can presently do little else. As the
potential of Chinese weapons systems increases, however,
there exist indications that the Chinese are building a more
robust limited nuclear deterrent. Limited nuclear
deterrence (in concert with the technological and economic
capability of the Chinese state) originally envisioned the
ability to inflict unacceptable damage with several
warheads aimed at enemy cities. It since matured into a
more sharply defined concept that now promises limited
counterforce warfighting capabilities. Limited deterrence
now means having enough capability to deter conventional
theater and strategic nuclear war and to control and
suppress escalation during a nuclear conflict. 45
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This shift invites several questions. Has the Chinese
nuclear stockpile expanded beyond the commonly accepted
75-100 warheads available for targeting against Taiwan
(and Japan) to a force that is more consistent with a limited
deterrence capability (250-300 warheads)? We do not know,
but remain convinced it has. The exceptional circumspection of the Chinese about the size and capability of their
ballistic missile force breeds mistrust. But doesn’t this shift
to greater capability justify TMD? Japan remains
unconvinced of benign Chinese intentions, while China
insists its declared NFU policy and strictly defensive
nuclear weapons offer indications of peaceful intent that
should be accepted at face value.
China’s threat of building to “limited” nuclear
deterrence is a thinly veiled suggestion that Japanese TMD
may provoke an even greater increase in the number of
Chinese missiles, the method by which they are deployed,
and the technical capabilities of the missiles (addition of
Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles [MIRV], decoys,
penetration aids, etc.). China developed and deployed its
first generation of missiles in 11 years. 46 The second
generation will take somewhat longer. Forecasted with an
initial operating capability during the year 2000, China’s
move to modernize occurred well before TMD became a
significant issue.
On the other hand, it can be argued that China is
progressing towards nuclear modernization anyway. It
came to the conclusion to do so independent of, or minimally
affected by, TMD considerations. Thus all the rhetoric about
U.S.-Japan TMD could be viewed as a ploy to justify the
expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, which would happen
anyway.
TMD Undermines Arms Control. The most articulate
expression of Chinese sentiments comes from Ambassador
Shu Zukang, who asserts that “the U.S. development of
missile defenses does not contribute to global stability nor
will it serve the interests of the U.S. itself.” 47He contends
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that NMD/TMD violates the 1972 ABM treaty, considered
by the Chinese as “the most important arms control protocol
being implemented,” and that the loss of this treaty will lead
to a disruption of the strategic balance between the United
States and Russia. 48This will, in turn, result in a greater
instability for all countries. Specifically, Sha asks, “How can
you expect progress in arms control and nonproliferation
while you yourself are developing NMD at full steam? It is
just wishful thinking.” 49Shu also hinted that rather than
engaging in an arms race, should the United States proceed
with its NMD/TMD deployments, “it would be quite possible
for China to review its policies on various arms control,
disarmament and nonproliferation issues, including FMCT
negotiations.” 50Chinese officials also assert that TMD
deployments will lead to a complete halt in global arms
control and nonproliferation, with direct implications for
START II, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Missile
Technology Control Regime and Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty. Chinese officials have gone so far as to declare
“NMD will also cause many nations to build up their nuclear
forces and further retard the disarmament process.” 51
Significantly, China avoids any overtures to participate
in multilateral ABM controls and continues to upgrade
Soviet designed surface-to-air (SAM) missiles for the
ballistic missile defense role. Since the U.S.-Russian
agreement on threshold testing of missile defense systems
clarified permitted capabilities, Chinese arguments about
undermining the ABM Treaty have lost their relevance. 52
China shows deep concern that should TMD/NMD
undermine the ABM Treaty, then Russian ratification of
START II and participation in START III would be
obviated, with negative consequences for Beijing.
Specifically, by withdrawing from the START III
preliminaries, the Russian threat to the northern Chinese
border would return, albeit on a smaller scale than during
the 1960s to 1990s rift between the two. This would divert
Chinese resources from development and modernization
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and inhibit the current free flow of technology and capital
between them. 53
TMD missile legitimacy also received a challenge under
the 1987 MTCR. Some states construed TMD development
as a form of missile proliferation. The United States
maintains that TMD development protocols do not
constitute a violation of the MTCR and will not contribute to
missile proliferation. 54
For its part, the United States maintains that it is not
rushing toward upper-tier TMD deployment in Japan and
that it remains undecided about selling lower-tier TMD to
Taiwan. The only TMD deployment decision the United
States has made addresses lower-tier TMD deployments in
Japan to protect U.S. troops and facilities. Taiwan cannot
“plug into” an existing TMD system, thus Chinese views of
TMD should not be based on the misperception that the
United States seeks to build a regional TMD architecture. 55
Possibilities.
The United States has four viable options in regard to
Northeast Asia theater missile defense. First, the United
States and Japan should continue to follow a path to
eventual deployment of a viable TMD system in Japan and
South Korea. The essential U.S. obligation to protect its
forward-based military personnel demands an effective
TMD in these two countries. Anything less could be
construed as gross negligence of a country’s obligation to
adequately protect its forces from a known, viable threat
that is economically and politically feasible to address.
Likewise, intermingling of the American and Japanese
population in Japan renders it impossible to protect one
without extending that protection to the other.
The alliance partners, however, should be exceptionally
cognizant of the remaining alternatives that would make
this bilateral choice more palatable to China and thus avoid
escalating the arms race. The second alternative would be to
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pursue THAAD, rather than NTW. If effective, this could
provide the home islands and the U.S. forces protection. Yet,
THAAD’s relative immobility and inability to extend its
“footprint” to Taiwan would be less likely to exacerbate
Chinese concerns about real or perceived alliance support
for Taiwanese independence. 56Of course, this would raise
new U.S.-Japan concerns, particularly with cooperative
development and less Japanese industrial participation in a
more mature system. But it may be worth this price not to
overtly antagonize Beijing.
A third choice, less likely since August 1999, is
production of TMD unilaterally by the United States.
Chinese analysts have consistently pointed out that
U.S.-Japan coproduction of TMD carries a fundamentally
different and more provocative political meaning for China
than if the United States produced such systems without
Japanese help as part of the U.S. strategy of protecting its
forward deployed forces. This directly challenges the
“protect us, protect them” pillar of U.S.-Japan TMD
partnering.
The fourth option calls for no deployment of TMD at all.
Proponents stress that this would obviate the Chinese
arguments about arms control and nonproliferation and put
real pressure on Beijing to be genuinely transparent about
missile development and deployment. Reconsideration of
deployment might also open up an opportunity to exploit
Chinese concerns and encourage Beijing to participate in a
formal trilateral security dialogue.
In contrast, the very real and more likely possibility
envisions continued Chinese obfuscation on its military
affairs. The overwhelming desire to build, deploy, and
maintain the military trappings of a “great power” remains
so engrained in the Chinese leadership’s psyche that any
risky attempt at placating Chinese fears with genuine
measures of conciliation would more than likely be fruitless.
Given the Taiwan problem and overwhelming superiority of
U.S. military power, China shows the deep-seated desire to
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develop its missile capability to a significant degree
regardless of U.S.-Japan TMD cooperation.
Conclusions.
By persistently increasing U.S. capabilities and
judiciously incorporating increased Japanese capabilities in
the U.S.-Japan alliance, the United States can fulfill its
obligation to its forward-deployed forces and allies in
Northeast Asia. The United States needs to be cautious,
however, about what new roles Japan plays in the alliance,
for TMD will fundamentally change that relationship. The
ultimate responsibility of an American President is to
provide for the safety of the American people and the armed
forces by deterring attack on the homeland and allies. By
increasing U.S. capabilities, the United States will be better
able to handle future regional crises and prevent them from
happening. Consistent actions in the face of inflammatory
rhetoric will avoid the destabilizing effects of an arms race
and backsliding on arms control and nonproliferation
agreements. Ultimately, such actions will contribute
mightily toward long-term peace and stability in Northeast
China.
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GLOSSARY

CTBT

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
International treaty whereby the
signatories agree not to conduct
nuclear device testing of any type.

EPCI

Enhanced Proliferation Control
Initiative. An initiative that enables
the U.S. Government to require
export license of all items, even those
not on the control list in the Export
Administration Regulations, if the
exporter knows, has reason to know,
or has been informed that the items
will be used in a nuclear missile.

Endo-Atmospheric

Within the earth’s atmosphere.
Generally regarded as less than 60
miles altitude.

Exo-Atmospheric

Outside the earth’s atmosphere.
Generally regarded as greater than
60 miles altitude.

FMCT

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

JTMD

Joint Theater Missile Defense. The
integration of joint force capabilities
to destroy enemy theater missiles in
flight or prior to otherwise disrupt
the enemy’s theater missile
operations though an appropriate
mix of mutually supportive passive
missile defense; active missile
defense; attack operations; and
supporting command, control,
communications, computers and
intelligence measures.
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Lower Tier

Those missile defense systems
developed for engaging theater
ballistic
missiles
in
an
endo-atmospheric role, usually in the
descent phase of flight. Missiles
engaged are usually shorter range
and lower speed (warheads traveling
< 5 km/sec)

MTCR

Missile Technology Control Regime.
An informal, non-treaty association
of states that have an established
policy or interest in limiting the
spread of missiles or missile
technology and of limiting the risks of
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction by controlling transfers
that could make a contribution to the
delivery of such weapons.

NAW

Navy Area Wide. A U.S. Navy
lower-tier missile defense system
under development by the United
States. Deployed from Aegis-class
cruisers, it uses a modification of an
existing surface-to-air missile to
engage theater ballistic missiles.

NMD

National Missile Defense. A U.S.
Program, run by the Department of
Defense Ballistic Missile Defense
Office (BMDO) tasked with
developing a system(s) that will
protect the continental United States
from ballistic missile attack.

NPT

Non-Proliferation Treaty. A treaty
designed to limit the formation of
multinational nuclear forces and
prevent the uncontrolled spread of
nuclear weapons.
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NTW

Navy Theater Wide. A U.S. Navy
upper-tier missile defense system
under development by the United
States and Japan. Deployed from
Aegis-class cruisers, it uses a
modification of an existing
surface-to-air missile to engage
theater ballistic missiles

PAC-3

Patriot Advanced Capability 3. An
upper-tier missile system under
development by modifying a version
of the Patriot surface-to-air missile
for intercepting theater ballistic
missiles.

SLV

Space Launch Vehicle. Those
vehicles whose primary purpose is to
launch into space with cargoes other
than weapons.

TBM

Theater Ballistic Missile. A missile
whose target may be within a given
theater of operations.

THAAD

Theater High Altitude Air Defense. A
U.S. Army upper-tier missile defense
system that utilizes an exoatmospheric “hit-to-kiss” missile and
warhead to intercept theater ballistic
missiles.

Upper-tier

Those missile defense systems
developed for engaging missiles in an
exo-atmospheric role, either in the
boost, ascent, or descent phase of
flight. Missiles engaged are usually
longer range and higher speed
(warheads traveling > 5 km/sec)

31

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert R. Ivany
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Author
Colonel Patrick M. O’Donogue, USMC
Project Advisor
Colonel Susan M. Puska
Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Christine A. Williams
Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler

